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SEARCHING FOR PARETO GAINS IN THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN FREE TRADE AND FEDERALISM: REVISITING
THE NAFrA, EYEING THE FrAA
Matthew Schaefer*
INTRODUCrION
Is devolution of power to sub-national governments by the constitu-
tion of federal states or by delegation in other nations a threat to maxi-
mizing the benefits of free trade within the Americas? Conversely, is the
drive towards regional free trade a threat to the goals of federalism and
decentralization? These are two of the many questions that arise in
revisiting NAFTA and eyeing the successful creation of a Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005, an initiative
launched by thirty-four nations within the region in December 1994.'
The scope of the FTAA is likely to be quite broad as indicated by
the initial working groups created by participating nations.2 Like other
recently concluded regional and multilateral trade agreements, including
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA)3 and World Trade
Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round Agreements,4 the FTAA will ad-
" Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. The author served as
a consultant to the National Governor's Association during the development of U.S. implementing
legislation for the NAFTA and Uruguay Round Agreements. The views expressed are those of
the author alone. The author would like to thank Professor John Jackson, University of Michigan
Law School, for his guidance during my LL.M and S.J.D. research.
' Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles, Miami, Dec. 11, 1994, reprinted in 34
LL.M. 810, 811 (1995).
2 The initial seven working groups that were established at a ministerial meeting in Denver,
Colorado in July 1995 were the following: 1) market access; 2) customs procedures and rules of
origin: 3) investment; 4) standards and technical barriers to trade; 5) sanitary and phytosanitary
measures: 6) subsidies, anti-dumping, and countervailing duties; and 7) smaller economies. Four
new working groups were created at the March 1996 ministerial meeting in Cartagena, Columbia.
They are the following- 1) intellectual property rights; 2) competition policies; 3) services; and 4)
government procurement. See 12 INT'L TRADE REP. 1120 (June 28, 1995); 12 INT'L TRADE REP.
2011 (Dec. 6, 1995).
' NAFrA, signed Dec. 17, 1992, reprinted in House Doc. 103-159(1, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 713 (Nov. 4, 1993).
" Signed April 15, 1994, reprinted in House Doc. 103-316(), 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1320
(Sept. 27, 1994).
23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 441 (1997). Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
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dress non-tariff issues, such as government procurement policies, techni-
cal standards for products, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and sub-
sidies, and seek to cover "new" trade negotiation topics, including trade-
in-services as well as investment-related matters. It is possible that the
linkage between trade and competition policy,5 trade and the environ-
ment, and trade and workers' rights will be raised during the course of
the FTAA negotiations as well.6 These so-called "link issues" were ad-
dressed to some extent in the NAFTA,7 which may serve as a model
for an FTAA, and currently receive varying degrees of attention within
multilateral trade fora.'
The scope of topics covered by these trade agreements raises the
issue of the relationship between international law and federalism (and
sub-national governments more generally). Sub-national governmental
measures, including measures of component units of federal states, will
continue by necessity to receive the increased attention of trade negotia-
tors. Sub-national governments are active regulators in matters addressed
by agreements on non-tariff barriers and the so-called "new" and "link"
trade issues.9 Thus, the strong economic policy reasons that exist for
binding sub-national governments to international trade agreement obli-
gations become even stronger once the comprehensiveness of trade
agreements expands to cover these "new" and "link" trade issues.
If the FTAA is to reach its maximum welfare-enhancing goal, the
agreement will need to constrain sub-national government as well as
national government discretion exercised for protectionist purposes. For
this reason, federal states with potentially significant constitutional and
political limitations on constraining sub-national governmental behavior
could be viewed as "problematic" by the regional system in attaining the
s A working group on competition policies will be established at the March 1996 ministeri-
al meeting-
6 U.S. proposals to establish a "study group of senior officials" to make recommendations
on environmental and worker rights processes within the FTAA have met "near-unanimous" op-
position from other countries. See Senior Officials Unable to Bridge Gap on Hemispheric Trade
Statement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 15, 1996 at 1, 23.
' See NAFTA, supra note 3, Chapter 15. See also North American Agreement on Environ-
mental Cooperation (hereinafter NAAEC) and North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(hereinafter NAALC), reprinted in THE NAF'A: SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS (1993).
' See Final WTO Singapore Declaration, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Special Report, S-
2-S-6, Dec. 16, 1996.
9 See Matthew Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for Internation-
al Trade Agreements to perform Constitutional Functions with Respect to Sub-Federal Govern-
ments?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 609-10 (1997). See generally Matthew Schaefer & Thomas
Singer, Multilateral Trade Agreements and U.S. States-An Analysis of Potential GATT Uruguay
Round Agreements, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 31 (Dec. 1992).
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goal of maximum welfare gains. Conversely, sub-national governments
in the region may view the move towards regional free trade as a threat
to their regulatory authority and the goals of federalism or decentraliza-
tion in a variety of areas. Fortunately, both -perspectives have recently
confronted these potential concerns and developed solutions within the
context of the NAFTA and the WTO Uruguay Round Agreements.
However, these solutions did not constitute Pareto optimal solutions.
Enhanced application and development of the substantive rules constrain-
ing sub-national governmental behavior to take protectionist actions can
occur without sacrificing the goals of federalism or other decentralized
forms of government.
Part I of this Article first defines federalism and distinguishes it
from other decentralized forms of government. It proceeds to explore the
goals of federalism and the goals of international trade agreements, with
specific reference to regional agreements. Part 1" analyzes the broadened
scope of modem trade agreements and the accompanying importance of
constraining sub-central government actions. Part III discusses the partic-
ular "problems" raised by federal forms of government for regional free
trade and economic integration. Part IV considers existing approaches of
international trade agreements regarding the applicability of rules to sub-
national governments. It will explore various techniques used to reduce
the impact of trade agreement rules on sub-national governments and
which of these techniques are justifiable in terms of obtaining the Pareto
gains described above. Part V considers possibilities for sub-national
governments to participate in the rule formation processes so as to over-
come political and legal obstacles to achieving Pareto gains in the rela-
tionship between regional free trade and federalism. Part VI concludes
that Pareto gains in the relationship between free trade and federalism
can occur by strengthening the application of anti-protectionism obliga-
tions to sub-federal governments. However, the current method of seek-
ing the individual consent of each state and province prior to strengthen-
ing the application of anti-protectionism obligations may need to be
replaced in order to achieve these Pareto gains at a more rapid pace.
I. FEDERALISM, DECENTRALIZATION, AND REGIONAL FREE TRADE:
THEIR RESPECTIVE GoALs
A. Federalism Defined and Its Existence in the Americas
In a federation, power is divided vertically between a central gov-
ernment and regional or local governments. As it divides power verti-
cally, federalism is to be distinguished from the horizontal division of
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
powers between different branches of government (commonly referred to
as the separation of powers). A feature of a federation that distinguishes
it from other decentralized forms of government is that the autonomy of
each level of government is in some way guaranteed. 0 In other decen-
tralized systems, the central government may devolve certain powers to
local governments for reasons of efficiency or politics, but local autono-
my is not guaranteed. Indeed, some definitions of a federal state require
that divided powers and/or the existence of the two levels of govern-
ment are guaranteed by a supreme constitution which is not unilaterally
amendable by either level of government and which is umpired by a
supreme court."
However, a distinction is often drawn between coordinate federalism
and cooperative federalism. In coordinate federalism the central and
regional governments must each have a guaranteed autonomous sphere
of action in which the other can not interfere. 2 Other theories focus on
cooperative federalism in which the central and regional authorities are
linked in a mutually interdependent political relationship. These theo-
ries are concerned with the bargaining that occurs between the two
branches of government and the persuasive abilities of one over the
other. While coordinate federalism focuses on structure, cooperative
federalism focuses on process. Recent studies suggest that federalism is
a matter of both structure and process, each element necessary for a
viable federal system. 4
The two countries within the Americas that have strong elements of
federalism in both structure and process are the United States and Cana-
da. 5 Therefore, these two nations provide the most fertile ground for
examining the interaction between federalism and regional free trade and
economic integration. However, other nations within the Americas with
long-standing federal traditions include Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil,"
all countries of major importance to the regional integration process.
Mexico is a NAFTA member while Argentina and Brazil are founding
members of MERCOSUR. NAFTA and MERCOSUR are both looked to
as models for a possible FTAA. However, these Latin American na-
'0 See DANIEL ELEZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 23 (1987).
" See Task Force on Canadian Unity, Coming to Terms: The Words of the Debate, at 4
(Feb. 1979). See also Klux, SovIEr FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 7 (1990).
2 See WILLIAM STEWART, CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM 55, 65-68 (1984).
13 Id. at 51-54.
14 See ELEZAR, supra note 10, at 67-68, 85 (1987).
" Id. at 69.
16 Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI
Im'mR-AM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1994).
' See, e.g., MERCOSUR Trade Pacts to Expand More Quickly Than NAFTA, Katz Says,
444 [Vol. 23:441 1997
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dions are considered federal in structure only."8 They generally lack
strong federal processes raising doubts as to the extent to which they
are ultimately federal. 9 Nevertheless, these nations have undertaken
movements of decentralization to varying degrees over the last de-
cade?3
Moreover, the broad scope and flexible nature of the meaning of
federalism across countries, and even within the evolution and develop-
ment of particular countries, displays the complexity of the concept. As
Professor Elezar concludes, "what is characteristic of a great political
principle [such as federalism] is both the essential simplicity in its basic
formulation and the richness of fabric woven around its base."2' Profes-
sor Stein has perhaps presented the best pragmatic image by suggesting
that one view various governments and international organizations along
a continuum of divided power systems.3 The governments and organi-
zations slide along this continuum as they devolve or integrate. It is a
constant task of both levels of government and the supreme constitution-
al court to find the appropriate federal balance 3 Thus, while this Arti-
cle focuses on the two strongest federal systems in the Americas, other
nations in the Americas may strengthen their federal systems in the
future. Moreover, regional free trade and economic integration may have
implications for decentralization in non-federal states.
B. The Goals of Federalism and Decentralization
Federalism has two primary goals: enhancing and protecting democ-
racy and fostering experimentation and innovation. Both goals can be
considered elements of a larger goal which is to maximize the attain-
INSmnE NAFrA, Nov. 1, 1995, at 11-12.
" Indeed, Argentina and Brazil are less federal in important structural respects as well. In
particular, the Argentine and Brazilian constitutions can be amended without the consent of a
majority of the component units governments. See Rosenn, supra note 16, at 6, n. 12.
19 See E_.EZAR, supra note 10, at 68; Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in
the United States and Its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMt INTr -AM.
REV. 1 (1990).
20 See ROSENN, supra note 16, at 8-9.
21 ELEZAR, supra note 10, at 83.
2 See The Foreign Affairs Power of an International Organization: The Case of the Europe-
an Community, 81 PRoC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 354 (1987).
2' See Koen Lenarts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP.
L. 205, 263 (1990); Woodrow Wilson, CONSTIUONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNrED STATES
178 (1911) (stating, "he question of the relation of the states to the federal government is the
cardinal question of our constitutional system .... It cannot, indeed, be settled by the opinion
of any one generation, because it is a question of growth, and every successive stage of our
political and economic development gives it a new aspect, makes it a new question.")
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ment of different preference sets of different geographic constituen-
cies.' Other forms of decentralized government or movements towards
devolution of power to lower levels of government share these same
purposes to a more limited extent.
Many political scientists and philosophers believe that democracy
functions best in smaller governmental units. It is thought that people
have better and more direct access to regional and local governmental
units.' However, federations divide power between national and sub-
national governments realizing that some issues are best dealt with on a
national level. The principle of subsidiarity, which has origins dating
back to ancient times,' but has recently assumed prominence in discus-
sions of European economic integration, is thought of as a useful princi-
ple to apply in deciding how to divide powers among various levels of
government. 7 The subsidiarity principle can be applied in non-federal
structures,' but does assume a government that is vertically divided
into several levels. The principle works on the assumption that decisions
should be made as close to the people affected by the decision as possi-
ble. It makes a presumption in favor of lower levels of government.
However, if lower levels of government are unable to address a problem
or if a higher level of government can regulate an activity more effec-
tively, the decision-making authority is elevated to the higher level of
government. 9
Federalism fosters experimentation and innovation. In contrast, if a
central government is given authority to regulate on a particular issue
2 Regarding the notion of preference sets, see Joel P. Trachtman, Reflections on the Nature
of the State: Sovereignty, Power, and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 399, 413 (1994). See also
Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34
HARVARD INT'L LJ. 47, 100-03 (1993).
' The information and technological developments of the past several decades have certainly
increased access to central government institutions, however.
' See W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law-American Feder-
alism Compared, 27 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 61, 63 (1995). Traces can be found as far back
as the works of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Note by the Directorate-General for Research,
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, Notice to Members No.
21/92, Sept. 11, 1992.
"' On the subsidiarity principle, see George A. Bermann, Subsidiarity and the European
Community, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 97 (1993); George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM-
BIA L. REv. 332 (1992).
2' Indeed, some have contrast subsidiarity which allows for flexibility with static allocations
of power under federal constitutions.
29 For more description, see Franziska Tschofen, Article 235 of the Treaty Establishing the
EEC: Potential Conflicts Between the Dynamics of Lawmaking in the Community and National
Constitutional Principles, 12 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 471, 504 (1991); Comment, The Subsidiarity
Principle, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 181-84 (1990).
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and it decides to regulate in the field so as to preempt conflicting com-
ponent unit government legislation, a bar has been placed in the way of
experimentation and innovation by the sub-national governments and
regulatory competition between sub-national governments.' In some
instances, specifically where policy issues transcend geographic bound-
aries, harmonization will clearly be preferred. For instance, certain envi-
ronmentally dangerous activities that have cross-border effects should be
regulated by the higher level of government because sub-units will have
no incentive to take into account the cross-border externalities when
regulating the activity and, thus, regulatory competition between sub-
units would lead to an inefficient regulatory result. In the international
context, efforts at harmonization are usually thought of in terms of their
effect on regulatory diversity among nations, but such efforts can also
affect regulatory diversity within nations.
C. The Goals of International Trade Agreements and the Importance of
Constraining Sub-National Government Behavior
International law can be seen as a means or instrument to achieve
various goals. International trade agreements seek to enhance world
welfare by increasing predictability and reducing barriers in trade rela-
tions between nations thereby allowing the economic principle of com-
parative advantage to operate more fully.31 If international trade law is
to achieve its goal of maximizing welfare gains, then it must seek to
have its barrier-reducing obligations become as universal as possible. For
instance, traditional trade theory based on comparative advantage sug-
gests that nations that liberalize trade increase their own welfare and the
welfare of the world. The more nations that liberalize trading rules, the
more world welfare increases. However, nations often will not unilateral-
ly liberalize for political reasons" (or based on new trade theories such
as strategic trade policy).3 Thus, refusal by some to participate in lib-
eralization typically means trading partners will not participate. Nonethe-
less, the multilateral trading system has long recognized that regional
(less than universal) arrangements may be beneficial to world welfare
SIn the E.C. context, see generally Hauser & Hosli, Harmonization or Regulatory Competi-
tion in the European Community, Auseen Wirtschaft 46 Jahrgang (1991) Heft HIIIV 497-512.
31 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE LAw AND PoLICY OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 10-14 (1989).
' See NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, 404-05 (Meinhard
Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersrnann eds., 1993).
' On strategic trade policy, see, e.g., Paul Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe? J. ECON. PERSP.
131-44 (Fall 1987).
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provided such arrangements remove (nearly) all barriers to trade.' The
trade creation effects of such regional arrangements are believed to
outweigh any trade diversion effects of such arrangements."
However, universality can be thought of in another context. The
universality of both multilateral and regional trade arrangements must
also be considered in the context of various levels of government. If a
multilateral or regional arrangement is to maximize the attainment of its
goals, it must apply to and be complied with by governmental actors at
all levels. There is both a political and economic element behind the
drive to bind sub-national governments to obligations within trade agree-
ments from the "international" perspective. A long-standing controversy
in international treaty-making between unitary and federal states has
been the extent to which component unit governments in federal states
should be bound. To the extent federal states sought to exclude applica-
tion of an international agreement to their component unit governments,
unitary states complained of an "imbalance" in obligations. As a result,
unitary governments might be less likely to enter into certain agreements
or seek to reduce the level of their obligations. Within the trade agree-
ment context, such consequences hinder the attainment of maximum
welfare gains.
On a purely economic level, it is clear that failure to address sub-
national government measures in a trade agreement would diminish
welfare gains. First, some sub-national governments within the Americas
represent territories with economies larger than many nations. For in-
stance, California and New York have economies larger than all but a
handful or two of nations in the world.36 Sixteen states and two prov-
inces would rank among the top twenty-five national economies; thirty-
three states and four provinces would rank among the top fifty national
economies.' Therefore, discriminatory or protectionist measures taken
by California and New York may have a greater impact on welfare
gains than measures taken by many other nations. Similar claims could
be made with respect to Mexican states and sub-national governments in
large South American nations such as Brazil and Argentina. 8 Second,
34 See GATr 1994, art. XXIV.
3' See Ken Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and the GAIT: The Legacy of a Miscon-
ception, 30 U. Ci. L. REV. 615 (1963); For an economic perspective, see CHARLES P.
KINDLEBERGER & PETER H. LmnDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 174-88, (7th ed. 1982).
' See Earl H. Fry, Sovereignty and Federalism: U.S. and Canadian Perspectives, Challenges
to Sovereignty and Governance, 20 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 303, 308 (1994).
3 Id.
' The economies represented by the membership of MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Para-
guay, and Uruguay) and NAFrA (Canada, United States, and Mexico) account for more than
[Vol. 23:441 1997
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failure to address sub-national governmental measures within interna-
tional or regional trade agreements would give a false incentive for
governments to decentralize certain areas of regulation. While no coun-
try would be likely to undergo constitutional change of government to
form a federal state as a result, central governments might seek to dele-
gate certain powers to sub-central governments for protectionist purpos-
es.
The need to bind sub-national governments in order to maximize
welfare gains becomes even larger when one considers another aspect of
universality or comprehensiveness, namely the types of barriers and the
scope of topics governed by modern international trade agreements. Sub-
national governments are generally prohibited from establishing tariffs
and other border measures,39 but regulate in many areas addressed by
non-tariff barrier agreements and agreements covering "new" and "link"
issues. In short, universality with respect to all levels of government
increases in importance as trade agreements become more comprehensive
with respect to types of barriers and scope of topics covered.
II. THE INTERAcTION BETwEEN FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW
A. Historical Perspective
The interaction between federalism and international law generally is
best seen in historical perspective. At the beginning of this century,
treaties dealt primarily with matters of peace and security, and other
matters indisputably within the external as well as internal competence
of central governments. Thus, federations did not typically face the
internal political and constitutional issue of whether the central govern-
ment could enter into treaties on matters within the internal legislative
competence of component unit governments and whether the central
government could implement these international obligations. Gradually,
however, foreign affairs came to be linked with domestic affairs, and
matters within the domestic legislative competence of component units
95% of the hemisphere's GDP and for more than 85% of intra-hemisphere trade. See Report to
the Presidents of the Review of Brazil-United States Trade Relations, reprinted in INSIE
NAFI'A, Nov. 1, 1995, at 16-18.
"' See, e.g., U.S. Constitution, art. I, see. 10, cl. 2. See also Matthew Schaefer, Are Private
Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for International Trade Agreements to Perform Constitu-
tional Functions with Respect to Sub-Federal Governments?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 612-13
(1997).
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of federations became the subject of international negotiation.' This
began most notably with the establishment of the International Labor
Organization in 1919 and conventions negotiated under its auspices
increased in the 1950s with. the negotiation of several major human
rights covenants, and expanded further with the GATT Tokyo Round
trade negotiations of the late 1970s. Today, the newly elevated agenda
items of international law, prominently including trade and economic
integration, typically involve negotiations on topics within the domestic
legislative competence of component units of federations."
B. The Scope of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements in Com-
parison to Previous United States and Canadian Trade Agreements
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 was
the primary agreement governing world trade in goods for nearly fifty
years.42 Several subsequent negotiating rounds were held under the aus-
pices of the GATT, which became de facto the institution governing
world trade after the United States failed to approve the International
Trade Organization (ITO) in the 1950s.43 The early negotiating rounds
under the auspices of GATT held in the 1950s and 1960s focused pri-
marily on tariff cuts, an area exclusively within federal government
jurisdiction.' The original GATT did require non-discriminatory appli-
cation of internal taxes and regulations,45 but very little else fell within
the realm of U.S. states and Canadian provinces.
This began to change with the seventh GATT negotiating round,
called the Tokyo Round, concluded in 1979. The Tokyo Round focused
in an extensive manner on non-tariff barriers, such as subsidies, govern-
ment procurement practices, and technical product standards for the first
time within the GATT system. The Tokyo Round culminated with a
' For a history of this phenomenon in Canada, see IVAN BERNMR, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 152-59 (1973).
"' See Schaefer, supra note 39, at 613-14.
4' 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947). This was so even though GATT itself never entered into force.
GATT was applied through a Protocol of Provisional Application which grandfathered existing
legislation inconsistent with Part H of the GATT. 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950). See also John H.
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH.
L. REV. 249, 294-297 (1967).
4 See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 42-53 (1969); JOHN H.
JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 9-17 (1990); ROBERT E. HUDEC, GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMAcY 59-61 (2d ed. 1990).
See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 43, at 52-53.
4s GATT 1947, art Ill.
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series of agreements or "codes" on non-tariff barriers.' However, the
potential impact of these agreements on the U.S. states remained rela-
tively slight. The United States refused to cover state entities under the
GATT Government Procurement Code.47 The Subsidies Code did apply
to state governments, however, its only stringent obligations related to
the use of export subsidies (which are rarely, if ever, granted by
states).' Its obligations with respect to domestic or general subsidies
were relatively weak. The Technical Standards Code applied to states,
but only required the federal government to use its "best efforts" to
achieve state compliance.49 Moreover, most GATT Contracting Parties
did not participate in the non-tariff barrier "codes" for they were al-
lowed to pick and choose which of the codes they would join. Canadian
provinces similarly were not bound to the Government Procurement
Code and were largely unaffected by other non-tariff barrier codes.
(Canadian provinces, however, were affected by U.S. countervailing duty
law).
The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), which
entered into force January 1, 1989, included provisions requiring non-
discriminatory treatment of services and service providers. This was the
first time a U.S. trade agreement with a major trading partner included
obligations regarding trade-in-services. The United States was already
seeking to have obligations regarding trade in services negotiated within
the GAIT Uruguay Round talks at this time. For the U.S. states, this
was important because they are active regulators in many services sec-
tors, including financial services and professional services. Canadian
provinces also actively regulate in the services area. However, the
CUSFTA broke no new ground with respect to sub-national government
procurement practices or subsidies.
The NAFTA, which entered into force January 1, 1994, built upon
the CUSFTA. Again, trade-in-services and investment issues were ad-
dressed by the agreement. However, new obligations can be found in the
NAiFTA. NAFTA's investment and financial services chapters contain
broader obligations than the CUSFTA. For example, the NAFTA places
See JOHN H. JACKSON, IDPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND 13-17 (1984).
See Schaefer & Singer, supra note 9, at 56-57.
Although this conclusion depends on the definition of subsidy. For a discussion of possi-
ble state export subsidies, see Schaefer & Singer, supra note 9, at 51-52.
49 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmnann, Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework of the GA7T
Multilateral Trade System: Possibilities and Problems of Making GA7T Rules Effective in Domes-
tic Legal Systems, in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTiATIONS: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 96-97 (Petersmann & Hilf eds., 1988); JACKSON, IMPLEMENTING THE
TOKYO ROUND, supra note 46, at 51.
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limits on the ability of a government to restrict the nationality of senior
management and boards of directors of NAFTA investors? ° While
states were not bound to any obligations in the area of government
procurement, the agreement envisaged state and provincial governments
undertaking commitments to be bound to such obligations in the future
on a voluntary and reciprocal basis.5 The NAFTA also did not directly
address the issue of subsidies. However, for the first time in a U.S.
international trade agreement, NAFTA spelled out detailed rules for
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, such as food safety standards and
those relating to pests or diseases on imported plants or animals. 2
States are active standard-setting bodies in the sanitary and phytosanitary
area.
Additionally, "side" environmental and labor agreements that applied
to the states (but to only two of the Canadian provinces as of yet) were
negotiated among the three NAFTA countries. The agreements require
governments to maintain laws providing a high level of environmental
and labor rights protection and to effectively enforce such laws.' A
persistent failure to effectively enforce an environmental or labor law
can lead to a challenge by another NAFTA country.'M In the United
States, states are the primary enforcers of environmental laws and ac-
tively regulate in the labor area. In Canada, the provinces maintain
nearly exclusive jurisdiction with respect to labor matters and significant
constitutional jurisdiction over environmental matters. 5
The Uruguay Round Agreements were signed by over 120 nations in
April, 1994 and most entered into force January 1, 1995. The UruguaLy
Round Agreements constituted a package of agreements under which
countries had to agree to abide by all agreements negotiated (with a few
exceptions). 6 The "single package" of agreements included a new Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) requiring non-dis-
criminatory treatment of services and service providers. The GATS
o NAFrA, supra note 3, arts. 1107, 1408.
S, NATA, supra note 3, art. 1024(3).
S2 NAFrA, supra note 3, Chapter 7B.
5 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), arts. 3-5; North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), arts. 2-3.
5 NAAEC, arts. 22-33; NAALC, arts. 27-37.
55 See PErER W. HOGG, CONSTrUTrioNAL LAw OF CANADA 461-66, 581-99 (2d ed., 1985);
Debra Steger, Canadian Implementation of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Orga-
nization, forthcoming in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND (Jackson & Sykes eds., 1996),
manuscript on file with author.
' The most notable of these exceptions is the renegotiated GAiT Government Procurement
Code which has only 23 signatories.
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applies more broadly to direct taxation of services and service suppliers
than the NAFrA services chapter 7 The package of agreements also
included an agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and tech-
nical product standards. Thirty-seven states became bound to some de-
gree to follow obligations within the renegotiated Government Procure-
ment Code after the federal government obtained their voluntary com-
mitments.58 The renegotiated code also covers procurement of services
for the first time.59 The new Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement con-
tinues to ban export subsidies, but also seeks to limit domestic (non-
export contingent) subsidies to a greater extent than the Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code.'
Thus, trade agreements increasingly address issues within the concur-
rent legislative, regulatory, and enforcement jurisdiction of the U.S.
states. In some cases they may even seek to address matters within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian provinces." The NAFTA and
GATT Uruguay Round Agreements are the culmination of a gradual
development of trade agreements to address non-tariff barriers in a
meaningful way and the successful pursuit to seek a greater openness in
"'new" areas such as trade-in-services. These non-tariff and new topics
entered international trade discussions because- of their importance to
expanding world trade. Indeed, the United States was one of the key
countries pushing for these issues to be addressed because of the com-
petitive advantage of the United States in many service sectors and the
detrimental effect of non-tariff barriers on U.S. exports. A significant
number of policy-makers and regulators throughout U.S. state capitols
are entirely supportive of new rules in these areas due to complaints
they receive from their states' exporters regarding foreign practices.
Indeed, U.S. state governors consistently supported negotiations in these
' See GATS, art. L Note, however, a major exception to the national treatment obligation
for measures "aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes
in respect of services or service suppliers of another [WTO] Member." GATS, art.
XIV(d)(goveming general exceptions). Cf NAFTA, art. 2103.
s U.S. Schedule Attached to the Agreement on Government Procurement, Annex 2, reprinted
in House Doc. 103-316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1, at 1989-95.
Government Procurement Agreement, art. 1(2), li(1).
See Schaefer & Singer, supra note 9, at 47-48.
" An example from NAFTA would be health services. However, for this reason the Canadi-
an government exempted current and future discriminatory measures related to health services
provided for a public purpose. See NAFTA, supra note 3, Reservations and Exceptions for Chap-
ters 11, 12, and 14, Annex H-Canada, reprinted in House Doc. 103-159, Vol. 1 at 1646 (reser-
vation for social services including health). A controversy arose between the federal government
and the provincial governments over the scope of this exemption during the "grandfathering" of
existing non-conforming provincial measures under Annex I.
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areas and their support was seen as particularly critical to the passage of
NAFTA. These strong beliefs in the non-protectionist treatment of for-
eign goods and services exist in many state capitols, despite the fact that
a new push has begun in these same state capitols for additional state
flexibility and powers with regard to non-trade related matters.62 How-
ever, such views are not universal.
Other state interests, particularly within regulatory agencies, focused
on how recent trade agreements might impact state sovereignty. Howev-
er, much of the analysis behind the U.S. state sovereignty rhetoric began
and stopped at a comparison of areas addressed by the trade agreements
and areas in which states exercised a degree of legislative, regulatory, or
enforcement authority. "Laundry lists" of state measures falling within
these areas were created and labelled as laws subject to preemption.'
However, noting that NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements ad-
dress a particular issue is only the starting point in assessing their im-
pact on states and provinces and whether the values of federalism are
somehow endangered. Any assessment of the impact of these agreements
upon the goals of federalism must include an examination of the prima-
ry obligations states and provinces, must follow and the significant ex-
ceptions carved out of the agreements for state and provincial laws."
mH. "PROBLEMS" RAISED BY FEDERAL STATES FOR REGIONAL FREE
TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
As noted above, Canada and the United States represent the stron-
gest federal systems in the Americas. As the analysis below shows,
"problems" can be raised in a variety of ways by different brands of
federalism. Federalism "problems" of the United States are somewhat
more veiled than those of Canada.
', As to the push for new flexibility in non-trade related matters, see, e.g., Conference of
the States: An Action Plan to Restore Balance in the Federal System, concept paper adopted by
the Council of State Governments, the National Governors' Association, and the National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures, Feb. 1, 1995.
' See, e.g., Center for Policy Alternatives, The New Supremacy of Trade: NAFTA Rewrites
the Status of States, Testimony Before the Florida House of Representatives, Nov. 3, 1993 at 21.
Additionally, some of the listed laws did not even fall within areas addressed by the NAFTA
such as occupational health and safety regulations.
' It must also include an analysis of the domestic law effect of trade agreements. See
Schaefer, supra note 39, at 609-52.
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A. United States
The United States Constitution enumerates several bases of power
for the federal government including the grant to Congress of the power
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.' The Tenth Amendment
reserves all powers not delegated to the federal government to the states.
Under constitutional interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court since the
late 1930s, the U.S. Congress can exercise broad powers under the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The test is whether the ac-
tivity sought to be regulated by the Congress has a significant economic
effect on interstate and foreign trade.' Such a test allows Congress to
reach purely "local" activities provided that such activities have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.67 Furthermore, Congress is al-
lowed to cumulate the total incidence of a practice to determine whether
it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.68 While the Supreme
Court recently struck down a federal statute under the Commerce Clause
for the first time in over forty years ("no guns in a school zone" legis-
lation), this decision does not in any way call into question the feder-
al government's constitutional ability to legislate on matters addressed in
trade agreements. Recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence also does not
change this conclusion." Moreover, even if the Supreme Court revived
some notion of reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment, it would
unlikely affect legislation enacting trade agreements.7 The Supreme
Court earlier in this century established the principle that federal govern-
ment has the power to implement any valid international agreement even
U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In the U.S. Supreme Court's most re-
cent opinion dealing with Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the Court at various
times refers to economic or commercial activity having a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce, in essence, shifting the economic modifier away from the effect to the activity itself. U.S.
v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1633, 1634 ("[Plossession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere substantially affect any sort of inter-
state commerce"). See also id. at 1640 (Kennedy concurring)C"[U]nlike earlier cases to come be-
fore the Court, here neither the actors nor their conduct have a commercial character").
67 See, e.g., Wickard v Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
6I
U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
70 New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992). For additional discussion and analysis, see Mat-
thew Schaefer, The Impact (If Any) of Recent Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence on the
Negotiation, Implementation, and Enforcement of Trade Agreements, (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
"' See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (protecting certain attributes
of state sovereignty, namely those representing "functions essential to separate and independent
existence" or "integral government functions"), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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if it would not have the power to legislate on the subject in the absence
of the agreement. 2
Nevertheless, the U.S. federal government faces many political ob-
stacles in regulating foreign commerce as a result of its federal structure.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution's main protec-
tion of state rights is the political process established by the Constitu-
tion.' Thus, the United States has what many have termed federal "re-
luctance" rather than federal incapacity to implement treaty obligations
affecting the states.7 4 These political constraints can be formidable, par-
ticularly in the areas of government procurement and direct taxation as
seen in the negotiation and implementation of the Uruguay Round
Agreements.
This federal reluctance has caused chagrin on the part of foreign
trading partners. For instance, federal government -negotiators recognized
as early as the Tokyo Round negotiations that they maintained the con-
stitutional power to bind states to follow non-discriminatory procurement
policies upon Congressional approval 5 After the failure to bind sub-
national procurement in the Tokyo Round, foreign trading partners,
particularly the European Community (E.C.), continued to complain
about the in-state preferences within state procurement legislation. In the
Uruguay Round, the E.C. refused to increase access of the U.S. suppli-
ers to E.C. telecommunications and other utilities procurement until U.S.
state procurement was bound to a certain extent to rules prohibiting
discrimination.76
One factor that would seem likely to reduce federal reluctance in
certain areas of trade negotiations is the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. The grant of power to the Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to imply
limitations on state actions even in the absence of Congressional action
preempting the state action.' Under the so-called dormant Commerce
' Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). For additional discussion and analysis, see
Matthew Schaefer, supra note 70.
' Garcia v. San Antonio, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). This is true even with judicially imposed
"outer limits." See supra notes 69-70.
' Regarding the distinction between federal reluctance and federal incapacity, see Corey
Oliver, The Enforcement of Treaties by a Federal State, 1974-I REcUEIL DES CouRs 333, 359
(1974).
" See John H. Jackson, United States, in JACKSON, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND,
supra note 46, 144.
6 See Gerard De Graaf & Matthew King, Towards a More Global Government Procurement
Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the
Uruguay Round, 29 INT'L LAw. 435, 442-43 (1995).
' See generally Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
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Clause doctrine, state actions that have a protectionist purpose or that
unreasonably burden interstate or foreign commerce will be held uncon-
stitutional. Political constraints should theoretically subside in those areas
in which restrictions imposed on the states via trade agreements are
already imposed upon the states as a matter of constitutional law. Many
areas addressed in trade agreements are subject to constraints under the
dormant commerce clause.78 However, due to the market participant
exception elaborated by the U.S. Supreme Court, state actions in the
areas of direct payment subsidies and government procurement are not
covered by the dormant Commerce Clause.79 Moreover, the federal
government has removed dormant Commerce Clause restraints on the
states in certain areas (such as insurance) through the enactment of fed-
eral legislation.' Therefore, the federal reluctance to binding the states
to obligations in these areas can not be expected to diminish as a result
of any existing constitutional restraints on the states.
For areas of state regulations and activities covered by both the
dormant Commerce Clause and international trade agreements, the rele-
vant question is whether the standards established by the Commerce
Clause differ to any significant degree from those within the internation-
al trade agreements. In practical terms, the differences appear to be quite
small. The general anti-protectionism obligation encompassed in the
national treatment obligation of the NAFTA and GAIT is to treat for-
eign products no less favorably than domestic "like products." Regula-
tion of services is subject to a similar obligation.
For states, the national treatment obligation means that they must
treat foreign goods and services as favorably as "in-state" goods and
services. However, it does not require them to impose the same taxes or
regulations as other states. This final point has been misunderstood by
some reading the only previous GATT dispute settlement case concern-
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1091, 1125 (1986).
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Equal Protection Clause
might also limit discriminatory state actions in some areas addressed by trade agreements. How-
ever, the Privileges and Immunities clause only applies to individual "citizens" while the Equal
Protection Clause applies to "persons," both natural and legal.
IThe Supreme Court first established the market participant doctrine in Hughes v. Alexan-
dria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). See also Reeves v. State, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); White v.
Mass. Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983). For the line drawn with
respect to direct subsidies and subsidies in the form of tax credits, see, e.g., New Energy Co. of
Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988). However, this line may have changed as a result of
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
' See, e.g., McCarran-Furgeson Act. However, the Equal Protection Clause might still disal-
low certain protectionist actions in these areas. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
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ing state laws, the so-called Beer II case. In the Beer II case, the GAIT
panel held that five states' laws that required common carriers to be
used for the importation of foreign-made beer violated the national treat-
ment obligation since in-state beer was not subjected to a similar re-
quirement." It then proceeded to consider whether the measure could
nonetheless be justified under GATT's general exception provision as a
measure "necessary" to secure compliance with tax laws.' In its
analysis, the panel noted that forty-five other states did not maintain
similar requirements and thus such requirements could not be considered
"necessary."83 While the panel could be criticized for not examining
whether other states measures were as effective for purposes of tax col-
lection, it did not rule that the difference in measures between states
violated the national treatment obligation. Rather, such measures could
not be deemed "necessary."
One additional concern among some state officials was that local
purpose would receive less consideration under GATT scrutiny than in
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. However, one recent study under-
taken by two distinguished scholars actually refutes such a proposition.
Professor Daniel Farber and Robert Hudec found that state regulatory
goals assumed at least as much and perhaps more importance in GATr
national treatment cases as compared with dormant Commerce Clause
cases." Empirical evidence of actual cases brought before U.S. courts
in the time between 1948-1994 appear to confirm this finding. A minus-
cule number of private parties choose to challenge state measures as
violations of GATT (despite the fact GATT was part of federal law
superseding state law during this time frame) as compared with the
number of private parties challenging state measures under the dormant
" GMT, Panel Report-United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
Basic Instruments & Selected Documents, 39th Supp. at 206 (adopted by GATr Council June
19, 1992) (hereinafter Beer I1).
'2 GATT, Art. XX(d).
83 Id.
" With respect to facially discriminatory measures, see Daniel A. Farber & Robert E.
Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GAYTs-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1421 (1994) ("[Plerhaps, the national governments who are
subjects of GATT law are in a relatively more powerful position than the U.S. state governments
subject to the DCC doctrine, and so are able to exert stronger claims on behalf of their 'other'
regulatory goals"). With respect to facially neutral measures, see id. at 1428 ("Mhe trick to
making Article 111:4 a sufficiently flexible and sensitive legal standard lies in finding some way
to interpret the 'less favorable treatment' standard in a way that will permit tribunals to limit its
application to more egregious measures that involve little or no genuine regulatory purpose. This
has been done with the "like product" test of Article I .... ) Recent "like product" jurispru-
dence within the W17O may possibly change this conclusion to a degree.
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Commerce Clause. If state measures were to receive stricter review
under the GATI, then private parties could have been expected to chal-
lenge state measures based on GATr standards."
While it may be possible that a law valid under the dormant Com-
merce Clause will be held a violation of the national treatment obliga-
tion (and unjustified under the general exceptions clauses) under the
dispute settlement processes of NAFrA or the WTO, such instances, if
they occur, will be very rare. During the debate over the Uruguay
Round implementing legislation, the state tax organizations frequently
referred to the Minnesota law that gave an excise tax break to all beer
brewed by microbreweries (regardless of where the microbrewery was
located) as an example of a law that was held invalid under GATr's
national treatment standard, but would be constitutional under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause."a The GATr Beer II panel held that products
do not become un-like merely because they are made by a different
production process (small versus large breweries).' However, process
distinctions will often not survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
either." Moreover, in any comparison, one must remember that state
actions that impact foreign commerce receive stricter scrutiny under the
dormant Commerce Clause than state actions which merely affect inter-
state commerce. 89
Nonetheless, the lingering uncertainty over the exact overlap of
dormant Commerce Clause constraints and constraints within interna-
tional trade agreements has lead certain state interests to oppose the
application of international trade agreement constraints to the states. One
clear difference between dormant Commerce Clause constraints and
international trade agreement constraints is the bodies that review wheth-
er states have complied with the respective constraints. State critics of
the trade agreements alleged that "faceless" tribunals are now allowed to
review state actions instead of domestic courts.' However, it is readily
's Arguably this might also have been due to a lack of knowledge by private parties about
the status of GATT. Additionally, GATT did not have as broad a coverage as the dormant Com-
merce Clause. For instance, GAIT obligations do not address direct taxation measures.
See, e.g., Multistate Tax Commission, News & Views, July 11, 1994, at 7.
Beer II, supra note 81, at J 5.19.
n For instance, is there any doubt that a state law which prohibited the sale of a product
made by a factory with pollution control technology of a lesser standard than that used by in-
state factories would be unconstitutional? See, e.g., Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S.'511, 528 ("It is
one thing for a state to exact adherence by an importer to fitting standards of sanitation before
the products of the farm or factory may be sold in its markets. It is a very different thing to
establish a wage scale.. . for use in other states, and to bar the sale of products ... unless
the scale has been observed").
See, e.g., Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
For a response to this criticism, see Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute
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apparent that a trade agreement allowing for neutral review of foreign
actions would never be achieved unless the U.S. federal and state gov-
ernments subject themselves to similar international scrutiny. Offers such
as "your standard is the one contained in the agreement, our standard
will be the one provided in our Constitution" are not accepted by for-
eign countries. The absence of an agreement would appear to leave U.S.
states at a disadvantage in terms of reciprocal treatment because the
states are already required to offer non-protectionist treatment in many
areas as a result of domestic constitutional constraints unlike some other
sub-national governments. Nevertheless, certain state interests would be
willing to sacrifice the attainment of free trade unless such an offer was
accepted.
B. Canada
The Canadian federal government has the power to enter into trade
agreements within the domestic legislative jurisdiction of the provinces.
However, the Canadian federal government faces potential constitutional
constraints in implementing certain obligations which places political
constraints on what it can in fact agree to in trade negotiations. While
the exact limitations on the Canadian government are unclear (and nei-
ther the federal government nor the provinces seem anxious to press a
court case that would address the jurisdictional issue), the federal gov-
ernment does not enjoy a broad commerce power or treaty implementing
power similar to that of the U.S. federal government.9
In its renowned 1936 decision in the Labor Conventions case,' the
Privy Council ruled that the Canadian federal government could not
implement those provisions of three labor conventions that addressed
matters within provincial legislative jurisdiction under the Constitution.
The thrust of the reasoning of Lord Akin was that the treaty implement-
ing power must be treated for constitutional purposes in the same man-
ner as any other disputed power-one must look to the specific heads of
power granted to the provinces and the federal government. In contrast
to the U.S. Constitution, the Canadian Constitution allocates specific
heads of power to both the federal and provincial governments and
leaves residual powers to the federal government. Lord Akin stated that
Settlement Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance?, 11 ST.
JoHN's J. LEGAL COMM. 307, 333-34 (1996).
9' HoGG, supra note 55, at 439 (noting this is a result of judicial interpretation); STEGER,
supra note 55.
'2 A.G. for Canada v. A.G. for Ontario, 1937 A.C. 326.
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"there is no such thing as treaty legislation as such. The distribution is
based on classes of subjects; and as the treaty deals with a particular
class of subjects so will the legislative power of performing it be ascer-
tained." Lord Akin summarized the impact of the decision on
Canada's international abilities and capacities in a benign manner:
It must not be thought that the result of this decision is that Canada is incompe-
tent to legislate in performance of treaty obligations. In totality of legislative
powers, Dominion and Provincial together, she is fully equipped. But the legisla-
tive powers remain distributed, and if in the exercise of her new functions derived
from new international status Canada incurs obligations they must, so far as legis-
lation is concerned, when they deal with Provincial classes of subjects, be dealt
with by cooperation between the dominion and provinces. While the ship of state
now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters, she still retains the water-
tight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure.'
Dicta in several recent Supreme Court cases express dissatisfaction
with the Labor Conventions case.95 Indeed, hints at reconsideration of
the Labor Conventions case have occurred at various times since the
decision. Nonetheless, it is unlikely in view of the constitutional crisis
facing the Canadian federation that the Supreme Court would brave
overturning the Labor Conventions case. Of course, the expansion or
contraction by the court of its interpretations of the various heads of
power could also alter the balance in treaty implementation (at least
with respect to trade agreements). Indeed, many would prefer the expan-
sion of particular federal heads of power rather than an overturning of
the Labor Conventions case to allow for federal treaty implementation
over some previously provincial subjects.' For instance, a broadened
interpretation of the federal trade and commerce power would allow
Canada additional flexibility in implementing trade agreements without
an overturning of the Labor Conventions case. For now, however, the
trade and commerce power has not been interpreted in a manner that
would allow for federal legislation over all matters having an economic
effect on interprovincial or international trade.' Rather, Canadian con-
stitutional interpretation focuses on the type of transaction and not the
economic effect on trade. In addition no stream of commerce analysis is
applied to transactions. The basic distinction drawn is between a regula-
' Id. at 351.
"' Id. at 353-54.
9' MacDonald v. Vapor Canada, Ltd., (1976) 66 D.L.R. 3d 1, (1977) 2 S.C.R. 134, 167;
Schneider v. Queen, (1983) 139 D.L.R. 3d. 417, 437.
9 See Gerard La Forest, The Labor Conventions Case Revisited, 1974- CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
at 151.
9 See HOGG, supra note 55, at 439; STEGER, supra note 55.
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tion affecting trade and a regulation in respect of trade." In short, both
the trade and commerce power and the "peace, order, and good govern-
ment" (pogg) clause have been narrowly interpreted so as to protect pro-
vincial jurisdiction." Therefore, unlike the United States, Canada has
potential constitutional and not just political restrictions hindering its
ability to implement trade agreements. In certain areas, Canada may suf-
fer from federal incapacity to implement trade agreement obligations
rather than mere federal reluctance.
Canada has no constitutional equivalent of the dormant Commerce
Clause. This is no surprise in light of the fact that the constitutional
ability of the federal government to act positively to prevent protection-
ism by and among the provinces under the Commerce Clause remains
incomplete. Thus, trade agreement obligations generally do not overlap
with existing domestic restrictions on the provinces. Instead, trade agree-
ment obligations generally represent truly new restraints on Canadian
provincial protectionism. The result of the conclusion of recent trade
agreements was that foreign goods might enjoy better access to a prov-
ince than goods from other provinces. This odd result lead to a new
push for elimination of interprovincial trade barriers. An intergovernmen-
tal agreement among the provinces was signed in 1994 to eliminate
numerous interprovincial barriers to trade,"° but its implementation re-
mains incomplete. Moreover, the interprovincial agreement was carefully
negotiated so as to not increase access to foreign goods and services
beyond that allowed by recent trade agreements.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT RULES
TO SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND TECHNIQUES MINI3NG CON-
STRAINTS OF THE RULES
A. The Extent To Which NAFTA and Uruguay Round Obligations Apply
to the U.S. States and Canadian Provinces As a Matter of International
Law
The customary international law rule that acts or omissions of com-
ponent units in violation of international obligations of the federal state
98 See John Whythe, Federal Powers Over the Economy: Finding New Jurisdictional Room,
13 CAN. Bus. L. J. 257, 286, 296 (1987).
' See John Quinn, Federalism and Foreign Economic Relations, 10 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 197, 211
(1985).
100 See generally GErrING THERE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AGREEMENT ON INTERNAL TRADE
(MJ. Trebilcock & Daniel Schwanen, eds.) (C.D. Howe Institute Policy Study #26, 1995).
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are attributed to the federal state, and give rise to the responsibility of
the federal state, is well-settled.' This is true even in those cases in
which the internal law of the federal state does not give the federal state
the power to compel compliance by the component units with interna-
tional obligations." Rapporteur Ago's report on international responsi-
bility for the International Law Commission notes a "consistent series of
legal decisions" since the 1875 arbitral award in the Case of the
"Montijo" in support of such a rule."ra The rule is unanimously cited
by commentators."°4 However, the rule regarding responsibility of a
federal state for treaty violations by its sub-federal governments can be
changed by the parties to a treaty. The customary international law rules
on responsibility apply in the absence of a contrary intent expressed by
the parties to a treaty.
Both the NAFTA and the GATT 1994 contain a general clause
regarding the applicability of obligations within those agreements to sub-
national governments. Those clauses are best understood by examining
first the clause found within the original GATT of 1947. The original
GATT contained a federal clause that was intended to deviate only
slightly from the customary international law rules that nations are re-
sponsible for actions of their sub-national governments that violate a
treaty. The original GATT's Article XXIV(12) stated:
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to
it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and
local governments and authorities within its territory.
The drafting history of the GATT 1947,"° as well as an analysis of
dispute settlement panel reports interpreting the provision,"° indicate
that to the extent a federal government had the constitutional authority
to ensure observance of a GATT obligation, the obligation applied to
sub-national government actions and the federal government was respon-
sible for any violation of the obligation. In the United States, it is clear
the federal government would have constitutional authority to ensure
observance with the possible exception of regulation of the distribution
101 IAN BROWNLiE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 141-42 (1983);
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 449 (4th ed. 1990); IvAN BERNIER,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 83 (1973).
' See, e.g., Pellat Case, V. Reports of International Arbitral Awards 536.
1971 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 257, § 175.
See supra note 101.
See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 110-14 (1969).
'o See Beer II, supra note 81; GATT Panel Report, Canada-Import, Distribution, and Sale of
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, 35 BISD 37 (1987-88).
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and marketing of alcoholic beverages due to the 21st Amendment. Un-
fortunately, the only GATT dispute settlement case regarding state laws
examined laws implicating this possible exception. In the so-called
GATT Beer II case, a GATT dispute settlement panel ruled that the
U.S. President (by delegation from Congress) would have the authority
to overturn state laws regulating the marketing and distribution of alco-
holic beverages, therefore making the United States responsible for the
state violations, despite the fact that the Supreme Court had not delin-
eated the exact relationship between federal powers under the Commerce
Clause and the 21st Amendment in all contexts.' 7
As noted above, the Canadian government's constitutional power to
ensure observance of international trade agreement obligations by its
provinces is subject to uncertainty in a wider range of areas. However,
even under this original version of Article XXIV(12) if a sub-federal
action were held not to violate a provision of the GAT because the
federal government did not have the constitutional authority to ensure
observance of the provision, the sub-federal action might still constitute
"nullification or impairment" of a tariff concession and lead to compen-
sation negotiations or a retaliatory suspension of concessions.
Nonetheless, the European Community sought a clarification within
the Uruguay Round of the provision due to its concerns that the clause
created an imbalance in obligations between federal and unitary
states."l5 The European Community has the power to ensure obser-
vance of sub-national governments with Community law, including inter-
national trade agreements. As a result, the GATI' 1994 adds the follow-
ing understanding of Article XXIV(12):
Each member is fully responsible under GATr 1994 for observance of all provi-
sions of GATT 1994, and shall take such reasonable measures as may be avail-
able to it to ensure such observance by regional and local governments and au-
thorities within its territory.
"0 Because of this factor, the United States tabled two "reservations" regarding portions of
the report while allowing adoption of the report within the GATT Council. See Statement of
Ambassador Rufus Yerxa to the GATT, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, SPEC. REP., June 26,
1992. For a discussion of the relationship between tha Commerce Clause and the 21st Amend-
ment, see Matthew Schaefer, supra note 70.
'"' The European Union claimed that "Article XXIV(12) should not operate as an escape
clause exempting some Contracting Parties from certain of their GATT obligations. It should be
made clear that Contracting Parties with a federal structure of government have the same obliga-
tions as those with a unitary structure." GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG7/20 (Aug. 21, 1990). See
also JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND 100 (1995) ("[The European] Community felt that GATr obligations were titled in favor
of federal states").
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Thus, GAIT 1994 leaves no doubt that a federal government is fully
responsible for all cases of non-observance by sub-national governments.
The amended Article XXIV(12) thus distinguishes clearly between the
separate issues of responsibility and remedial action. Unitary states and
federal states have the same responsibility regarding sub-national govern-
ment observance but might obviously have different abilities to actually
enforce compliance by sub-national governments. The text also clarifies
that consistent with existing GATT practice, dispute settlement cases
may be brought regarding sub-national government laws and practic-
es."° Additionally, provisions relating to compensation and suspension
of concessions apply in such cases where it has not been possible to
secure sub-national government observance.1
Other Uruguay Round Agreements annexed to the WTO, including
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on
Subsidies, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, although sometimes
utilizing different language, contain similar clauses that clearly indicate
that obligations within those agreements generally apply to sub-national
measures."' Moreover, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU),
which applies to all of these "covered" agreements, explicitly states that
"[tihe dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements may be
invoked in respect of measures affecting their observance taken by re-
gional or local governments or authorities within the territory of a Mem-
ber.""
2
The NAFTA (as well as the CUSFTA) also sought to remove any
doubt over the general applicability of those agreements to state and
provincial laws and the corresponding responsibility of the respective
federal governments for sub-federal violations. Thus, the NAFTA, and
previously the CUSFTA, did not utilize the language from the original
GATT 1947. Rather, the NAFTA, in Article 105, states: "[tihe Parties
shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect
to the provisions of this Agreement, including their observance, except
as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and provincial govern-
ments." This provision is- identical to that found in the CUSFTA."'
"0 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATr 1994, para. 14, re-
printed in House Doc. 103-316, Vol. 1, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1347.
110 Id.
... See, e.g., GATS, art. 1(3); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 1.1.
112 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 22.9.
U.S.-Canada FIA, art. 103.
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B. Techniques Minimizing Constraints on Sub-National Governments
Therefore, obligations within both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
Agreements apply to state laws as a general matter and state laws are
exposed to challenge under these trade agreements. However, various
techniques are used to reduce the exposure of state and provincial laws
(and sometimes federal laws) to challenge under both the NAFTA and
the WTO Agreements. The most important of these techniques follow:
1) Encouraging but not mandating the use of international and harmo-
nized standards;
2) Negotiating obligations with which existing laws comply and future
laws will (likely) comply;
3) Allowing "grandfathering" or exemption of existing laws that do not
conform to anti-protectionism and other central obligations;
4) Allowing states and provinces to voluntarily choose whether they will
be bound to certain agreements and tailor the extent to which they will
be bound.
The use of these various techniques and how they reduce the impact
or constraints of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round Agreements on states
and provinces will be illustrated below with an emphasis on examples
from the NAFTA. The illustrations are not exhaustive, but seek to high-
light some areas of potential concern to the U.S. states (and Canadian
provinces) within international trade agreements.
Technique #1: Encouraging, But Not Mandating, the Use of Interna-
tional and Harmonized Standards
Illustration A: NAFrA Chapters on Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures
and Technical Barriers to Trade
The NAFTA Chapters on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures
and on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) seek to promote the use of
international standards and the harmonization of those standards. Howev-
er, the chapters do not compel the use of such standards. The rationale
for seeking harmonization is clear. Harmonized standards can lower
costs to both consumer and producers as producers are able to create
longer production runs with less interventions. Additionally, harmoniza-
tion eliminates the opportunity to create protectionist standards. Howev-
er, harmonization also reduces the flexibility for variation among nations
and among sub-national jurisdictions. Variation, both nationally and sub-
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nationally, may be required due to different geographic conditions, dif-
ferent native flora and fauna, or simply because of different values
reflected in different levels of protection of human health. Moreover, as
a practical matter, international standards tend to achieve a relatively
low level of protection of human health.
The NAFTA states that the obligation to base SPS measures on
international standards "shall not be construed as preventing a party
from applying an SPS measure that is more stringent than a relevant
international standard."... 4 However, if an SPS measure is not based on
an international standard, then a Party whose exports are adversely af-
fected or may be adversely affected may request reasons for the measure
from the other Party and the other Party is required to provide their rea-
sons in writing."' If an SPS measure conforms to a relevant interna-
tional standard, it is presumed to be consistent with the NAFTA." 6 A
measure that achieves a level of protection different from that which
would be achieved by a measure based on an international standard is
not presumed to be inconsistent with NAFrA "for that reason
alone.""..7 Additionally, the SPS Chapter explicitly recognizes the rights
of Parties to set their own levels of protection of human, animal, and
plant life, and health. It was intended by the negotiators from the three
nations that these rights apply to all levels of government within a na-
tion.
Further provisions of the SPS Chapter require the Parties to pursue
"equivalence" (meaning anything between harmonization of standards or
standards similar enough that they achieve equivalent levels of protec-
tion) "to the greatest extent practicable," but again "without reducing the
level of protection of human, animal, and plant life or health
[HAPL-]."" Under these provisions, a Party must accept as equiva-
lent those SPS measures of another Party in which the other Party has
provided scientific evidence to demonstrate objectively that the SPS
measure will achieve the importing Party's appropriate level of protec-
tion. An importing Party is allowed to refuse to accept as equivalent
those SPS measures which do not achieve the importing Party's appro-
priate level of protection provided it has a scientific basis and provided
it gives the reasons in writing expressing this basis." 9 An exporting
,, NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 713(3).
uS NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 713(4).
116 NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 713(2).
117 Id.
"a NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 714.
"9 NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 714(2).
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Party, if it is seeking to have its SPS measure recognized as equivalent,
must provide access in its territory to an importing Party for the purpose
of testing and inspection." Lastly, the SPS measures of other Parties
"should" be considered in the development of a Party's own mea-
sures.1
21
The NAFTA Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Chapter (which
applies to product standards not covered in the SPS Chapter) adopts a
similar approach to that of the SPS Chapter. It only requires the Parties
"to the greatest extent practicable" to make compatible their respective
standard-related measures. Moreover the TBT Chapter allows Parties to
deviate from international standards in a variety of instances. Specifical-
ly, the TBT Chapter only requires Parties "to use -as a basis for its
standards-related measures relevant international standards or internation-
al standards whose completion is imminent, except where such standards
would be an ineffective or inappropriate means to fulfill its legitimate
objectives, for example because of fundamental climatic, geographical,
technological or infrastructural factors, scientific justification or the level
of protection that the party considers appropriate."'" By adding this
last factor of "appropriate level of protection," the TBT agreement rec-
ognizes that different jurisdictions may maintain different values even if
such values are not based on "fundamental" objective factors.
The TBT Chapter also explicitly recognizes the rights of the Parties
to set their appropriate levels of protection. Again, this right belongs to
all levels of government within a NAFTA nation. The TBT Chapter
gives a presumption of NAFTA legality to standards that conform to an
international standard." However, the chapter adds that the above ob-
ligation shall not be construed to prevent a Party from maintaining a
standard-related measure that results in a higher level of protection than
would be achieved if the measure were based on the relevant interna-
tional standard.' Thus, if one has established a domestic standard dif-
ferent than an international standard, the domestic standard must achieve
a higher level of protection and cannot simply be an arbitrary distinction
that results in no higher protection.
'20 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 714(3).
121 NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 714(4).
'2 NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 905(1).
'23 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 905(2).
124 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 905(3).
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Technique #2: Negotiating Obligations With Which Existing Laws
Comply and Future Laws Will (Likely) Comply
Illustration B: NAFTA Chapter on Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures
Trade negotiations over the past two decades have increasingly fo-
cused on standards-related matters, including standards related to food
products, animals, and plants. The outcome of these negotiations has
been an increased emphasis on scientific justification or scientific basis
for such measures. The rationale behind these developments is clear. It
is felt that national treatment is no longer enough. A nation may treat
foreign goods equal to its own, but nonetheless its regulations may be
irrational and hinder beneficial trade unnecessarily. Thus, it is felt that
science could bring some objectivity into deciding whether a regulation
was rational. However, science cannot tell society how much risk to
tolerate (i.e. there is a distinction between science and public policy).
NAFTA recognizes the difference between science and public policy by
requiring a scientific basis and a risk assessment for SPS measures, but
allowing a government to choose its appropriate level of protection.
Under NAFTA, state SPS measures are required to have a scientific
basis and are accompanied by a risk assessment. Existing state laws
meet these two criteria. Moreover, states maintain processes that will
ensure that future laws comply with these obligations. Article 715 enu-
merates the criteria which must be taken into account when conducting
a risk assessment. Many states rely wholly or in part on federal risk
assessments for some of their measures. Under NAFTA, states may
continue this practice. The use of the terms "as appropriate to the cir-
cumstances"'" and "take into account"' is language that eliminates
any need to conduct a separate state risk assessment or make more
formal or extensive risk assessment procedures. Discussions with nego-
tiators and officials from the three countries indicate that there must
only be some logical or rational connection of SPS measures to scientif-
ic findings.
Technique #3: Allowing "Grandfathering" or Exemption of Existing
Laws That Do Not Conform to Anti-Protectionism and Other Central
Obligations
' NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 712(3)(c).
'' NAFMA, supra note 3, art. 715(1).
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Illustration C: NAFTA Chapters on Services, Investment, and Financial
Services
National treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment are
required by the services, investment, and financial services chapters of
NAFFA.' The national treatment obligation requires treatment of for-
eign service providers, investors, and their investments be as favorable
as "in-state" services providers, investors, and their investments. Howev-
er, the national treatment obligation in the financial services chapter is
somewhat different than in the non-financial services and investment
chapters. Although the wording is somewhat confusing, it is intended to
incorporate the "home state" rule of U.S. banking law such that a state
only need treat a foreign bank established in another state as favorable
as U.S. banks established in that other state.
Each of these chapters contains several other major obligations. For
instance, the services chapter states that "no Party may require a service
provider of another Party to establish or maintain a representative office
or any form of enterprise, or to be resident, in its territory as a condi-
tion for the cross-border provision of a service. ' ' " As another exam-
ple, the investment chapter contains a prohibition on performance re-
quirements.'
State laws existing as of January 1, 1994 were initially exempt from
the national treatment and other central obligations of the investment
and services chapters for an initial period of two years (or until January
1, 1996)."3 Those inconsistent with the major obligations of the finan-
cial services chapter were exempt for an initial period of one year (or
until January 1, 1995).' During these initial exemption periods (which
were extended to March 31, 1996 for the investment and services chap-
ters'), the states and provinces worked together with their respective
federal governments to identify specific measures that did not conform
to these obligations. Specific measures identified as inconsistent with
obligations were to be placed in Annex I of the NAFTA by the federal
government. Measures placed in Annex I were to be in the form of a
citation to a specific provision of state law, regulation, or judicial opin-
'27 NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1202, 1203.
"a NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1205.
129 NAFMA, supra note 3, art. 1106.
'3o NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1108(1)(a)(ii).
'' A few states were required to have identified and list in an annex their non-conforming
financial services measures by the date of entry into force of NAFrA (or January 1, 1994).
"3 See NAFTA Nations Delay Listing of Sub-Federal Services Exemptions, INSIDE NAFMA,
Jan. 10, 1996, at 12-13.
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ion. Placement in the annex was to have the effect of "grandfathering"
or exempting these NAFTA-inconsistent measures from challenge for an
indefinite period of time.' The process was completed as scheduled
with respect to the financial services chapter. However, as the process
continued, several states and provinces worried that the identification
process failed to capture all measures that might be successfully chal-
lenged as inconsistent with the NAFTA chapters. Indeed, some states
and provinces at certain points in the process sought to "grandfather"
their entire state code.'34 Additionally, the United States found incon-
sistent reporting of measures among the fifty states. Thus, the NAFTA
countries agreed that all state and provincial measures inconsistent with
NAFTA Chapters on Investment and Services and existing as of January
1, 1994 would be "grandfathered" without requiring identification and
specific listing in Annex I 5 In essence, the NAFTA parties returned
to the approach of the CUSFTA which also did not require identification
of specific measures inconsistent with its services and investment obliga-
tions."3
The reason the NAFTA text was negotiated to initially require state
and provincial measures to be identified was twofold: first, to provide
greater transparency and, second, to provide a list for future liberalizing
negotiations. Both of these goals have been undercut to a certain extent
as a result of the N AFTA parties' agreement that specific measures
would not require identification and listing in order to be
"grandfathered." While the parties have apparently exchanged a list of
state and provincial measures that have been developed, it is an incom-
plete listing and thus does not provide full transparency nor a complete
list for any future liberalization negotiations.
Technique #4: Allowing States and Provinces to Voluntarily Choose
Whether They Will Be Bound to Certain Agreements and Tailor the
Extent to Which They Will Be Bound
133 Id.
'34 See Oregon Seeks Extension of NAFTA Deadline for Services Reservations, INSIDE
NAFrA, Dec. 27, 1995, at 3-5.
'35 See NAFTA Parties to Protect Existing Sub-Federal Measures Indefinitely, INSIDE NAFrA,
Apr. 3, 1996, at 1.
" It is important to note that "grandfathered" laws are subject to a "one-way street" in that
such laws only can be amended to increase their conformance with NAFTA obligations in order
to maintain an exemption from NAFrA obligations and potential challenge.
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ilustration D: Renegotiated GATT Government Procurement Code
The NAFTA explicitly states its intention to constrain sub-national
government procurement practices in the future." However, it notes
that this will only be done on a "voluntary" and "reciprocal" basis.'
Thus, it appears future NAFTA negotiations will follow the approach of
obtaining state commitments to the GATT Government Procurement
Code. Binding U.S. states to obligations within the renegotiated GATr
government procurement code was handled on a voluntary basis. As
noted before, thirty-seven states (through the political consent of their
governors) voluntarily agreed to become bound to some extent to the
renegotiated GATT Government Procurement Code.
Previous efforts by the federal government sought state commitments
under an "all or nothing" approach. Under this approach, states would
have to decide to bind all state entities or none at all. A more flexible
approach was adopted in 1992 by which states could choose which state
entities would be covered by Code obligations (although states were
obviously encouraged to list as many as possible) and which products or
services procured by these listed entities would be subject to Code obli-
gations. Thus, states were able to tailor their commitments so as to
account for existing procurement laws.
The Code requires non-discriminatory treatment of bidders from
foreign countries which are signatories of the Code.3 It also elabo-
rates procedures to be followed for procurement, such as the amount of
notice that must be given to bidders."4 The federal government
worked with the National Association of State Procurement Officers
(NASPO) during negotiations to minimize the impact of administrative
obligations. However, only entities listed in an annex to the agreement
are bound to follow Code obligations. 4' States also received the op-
portunity to exclude the procurement of certain politically sensitive items
from coverage under the Code. For instance, a note to the annex listing
state entities excludes procurement of construction-grade steel, automo-
biles, and coal. 42 This exclusion applies to many of the thirty-seven
states. Several states excluded additional products from coverage under
'" NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1024(3).
13' Id.
' Government Procurement Agreement, art. 1H.
Government Procurement Agreement, art. IX.
'4' Government Procurement Agreement, art. 1(l).
", U.S. Schedule Attached to the Government Procurement Agreement, Notes to Annex 2, re-
printed in House Doc. 103-316, Vol. 1 at 1995.
(Vol. 23:441 1997
Schaefer-FREE TRADE AND FEDERALISM
the Code. For instance, the state of Washington exempted procurement
of "fuel, paper products, boats, ships and vessels" and the state of South
Dakota exempted the procurement of "beef."'43 Procurements for mass
transit and highway projects using federal funds and subject to restric-
tions (such as "prevailing wage" requirements) are also exempted.'"
An exemption from Code obligations for preferences for small and mi-
nority businesses is also included.145 Lastly, the Code does not apply
to contracts which do not reach a threshold level elaborated by the
agreement.'" The threshold is established higher for sub-national gov-
ernment purchasing than for central government procurements.
In short, the states tailored their commitments such that existing
laws would not need to be changed in order to conform to Code ob-
ligations. Existing protectionist procurement laws were in essence
"grandfathered." Thus, the potential impact of the renegotiated GATT
Government Procurement Code on U.S. states appears rather meager.
The only potential problem that could arise is if a state legislature in
one of these thirty-seven states should enact a new preference that
would need to be enforced by a covered procuring entity on a product
or service not exempted from coverage and the procurement was above
the threshold established by the Code. To be sure, the "bite" of the
Code is already being felt by one state-Massachusetts-which recently
enacted legislation that may conflict with the Government Procurement
Code by prohibiting the state from transacting business with companies
active in Burma. However, notwithstanding such state "foreign affairs"
legislation, the trend in most states is away from preferences and pro-
cesses that discriminate against foreign bidders and thus, this is unlikely
to occur. In an era of limited budgets, state governments are seeking
competitive bids to reduce taxpayer costs.
Canada has refused to make any offer regarding provincial procure-
ment under the renegotiated GATT Government Procurement Code.
Canada is demanding that the United States improve its offer regarding
sub-national procurement prior to the making an offer. 47 As a result,
the rules of the agreement with respect to U.S. state procurement will
not apply vis A vis Canada."
' Id. at 1993-94.
I" d. at 1995.
'' Id.
I d. at 1989.
"' See Canada, U.S. Deadlocked over Sub-Federal Procurement in WTO Talks, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Dec. 22, 1995, at 10.
14 id.
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Illustration E: North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC)
NAFTA's side environmental agreement requires that governments
including state governments in the United States and Mexico, maintain
environmental laws providing for a high degree of environmental protec-
tion and the effective enforcement of such laws. 49 A persistent failure
to effectively enforce environmental laws can lead to a dispute settle-
ment case by one nation against another. If a persistent failure to effec-
tively enforce is found (an unlikely occurrence),"5 the first remedial
step is the development of an action plan. The offending party can
propose its own action plan or have one recommended by the dispute
settlement panel established to hear the dispute.' If a party fails to
follow an action plan, then a monetary penalty can be imposed.' If
the party fails to pay a monetary penalty, then trade sanctions can be
imposed to collect the monetary penalty. In the case of Canada,
trade sanctions are not possible because the Canadian government agreed
to establish a mechanism by which the monetary penalty can be en-
forced in Canadian courts. 4
The agreement currently applies to only two of the Canadian prov-
inces for matters within their jurisdiction. Canadian provinces
maintain significant jurisdiction over environmental matters along with
the federal government. The Canadian federal government did not want
to risk paying a monetary enforcement penalty for lack of provincial
enforcement when it could not necessarily compel the provincial govern-
ment to enhance its enforcement.
Therefore, application of the agreement to a particular province with
respect to matters within its jurisdiction is based on the consent of that
province. Provinces that agree to be bound with respect to matters with-
in their regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction will be included in a
149 NAAEC, supra note 7, arts. 3,5.
IS This is unlikely because a reasonable exercise of discretion and allocating resources to
higher priorities does not constitute a failure to effectively enforce. See NAAEC, supra note 7,
art. 45. Moreover, changing existing law to require less enforcement immunizes enforcement
action from challenge. See Opinions on the Endangered Species Act and Logging Rider at
<http://www.cec.org.hunl>.
,51 NAAEC, supra note 3, arts. 33-34.
,52 NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 34(5).
... NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 36.
'u NAAEC, supra note 3, Annex 36A.
155 See Quebec Signs on to NAFTA Environmental Cooperation Pact, 14 INT'L TRADE REP.
30 (Jan. 1, 1997).
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Canadian declaration made under Article 41 of the agreement. To date,
only Alberta and Quebec are included in the declaration. Alberta and
Quebec have signed an intergovernmental agreement elaborating coop-
eration between the federal and provincial governments on the NAAEC.
Under the intergovernmental agreement, signatory provincial govern-
ments agree to be bound to the NAAEC and in exchange receive certain
rights to participate in the formation of Canadian positions within
NAAEC and dispute settlement cases under the NAAEC.
The NAAEC attempts to balance the rights and obligations of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico under the agreement by preventing
Canadian access to the dispute settlement process in those cases in
which the complaint is at the instance of a province not bound by the
agreement or in which the matter would fall within provincial jurisdic-
tion in Canada and provinces accounting for at least fifty-five percent of
GDP have not become bound to the agreement. To date this fifty-five
percent of GDP test has not been met.56 Thus, enforcement in the
United States and Mexico is subject to less possible scrutiny as a result
of the need to balance rights and obligations.
There is no sense of urgency among other provinces to join the
agreement. The agreement is a relatively low-priority matter in many
provincial governments. Provincial governments are facing budgetary
cuts and are reluctant to accept an obligation which could result in a
monetary penalty (however remote the possibility). Moreover, the bene-
fits of joining the agreement, such as the right to instigate a complaint
by Canada against the United States or Mexico and the right to partici-
pate in the formation of Canadian positions within the Council created
by NAAEC, are not "exceedingly tangible."'"
C. Impact of the Various Techniques on the Goals of Free Trade and
Federalism
While non-exhaustive, the illustrations of Techniques #1 through 4
above indicate that the impact of existing trade agreements on sub-feder-
al governments is relatively modest. The question of whether further
trade liberalization can be achieved without unduly endangering the
goals of federalism and decentralization necessarily arises. While sub-
federal measures are currently not a priority item on the agenda of an
"6 Quebec Signs on to NAFTA Environmental Cooperation Pact, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 30
(Jan. 1, 1997).
"7 I borrow this last phrase from an official of a Canadian provincial or the federal govern-
ment with whom I spoke about the agreement.
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FTAA, or immediate future negotiations within the NAFTA or
WTO,"5 ' the issue will need to be confronted at some point in the fu-
ture in one of these forays. When the issue is confronted, policy makers
will need to decide simultaneously which of the techniques described
above are most threatening to the goals of free trade and which are
necessary to protect the goals of federalism (and decentralization).
In distinguishing between Techniques #1 through 4, a distinction
between two types of frequently observed obligations in trade agree-
ments needs to be drawn. The first type of obligation is one prohibiting
protectionism, or in other words, prohibiting more favorable treatment of
in-state products and services vis A vis foreign products and services.
The second type of obligation is one promoting harmonization of stan-
dards. The second type is a greater threat to the goals of federalism and
thus, there may be legitimate reasons for proceeding more cautiously
with respect to the second type of obligation.
Why are anti-protectionism obligations less threatening to the goals
of federalism than harmonization obligations? Federalism cannot be seen
as supporting unbridled local autonomy. While federalism preserves
spheres of local authority, exercise of this authority in a protectionist
manner necessarily endangers the political and economic union for
which federations are created. Economic union was a central goal in the
formation of both the United States and Canadian federations. Scholars
and judges arguing for an expanded interpretation of the Canadian
Constitution's federal trade and commerce power believe that the narrow
interpretation has endangered economic union. Legal restraints on pro-
tectionism do not impair the non-economic values (and the different
weights assigned to these values) pursued by sub-national governments.
Anti-protectionism obligations allow local autonomy in decision-making,
but not in such a manner as to unnecessarily reduce welfare gains of
free trade. To take an easy example, the national treatment obligation
within GATT 1994 and GATS does not require states to set identical
sales tax or income tax rates. Similarly, anti-protectionism obligations do
not require sub-national governments to set identical SPS or technical
standards. Each government can achieve its own level of revenue and
protection of human health, respectively, consistent with anti-protection-
ism norms. One of the major goals of federalism and decentralization
described above was to promote experimentation and regulatory compe-
tition so as to maximize the differing "preference sets" of different
" One would need to weigh political considerations as well.
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territorial constituencies. '59 Anti-protectionism obligations do not inter-
fere in this goal of federalism and decentralization, but rather ensure
that such goals are reached in an economically efficient manner. One
experiment that has been tried and failed is protectionism.
In contrast, mandatory harmonization obligations can interfere with
experimentation by and regulatory competition among sub-federal juris-
dictions. There may be an economic efficiency rational to harmonized
standards, however, the pursuit of the goal of economic efficiency in
this manner interferes with other non-economic goals and maximizing
the attainment of differing "preference sets" of different geographical
territories."w This is not a claim that harmonization should be avoided
in all instances. Harmonization of some standards may not interfere with
different preference sets of non-economic values, but rather may be
simply matters of efficiency (e.g. standards analogous to laws establish-
ing which side of the road to drive upon). However, a situation involv-
ing some "give and take" between the goals of free trade and federalism
is likely to be most prevalent in the context of harmonization.
Thus, Technique #1 poses the least amount of concerns if our goal
is to maximize welfare gains under trade agreements without unneces-
sarily diminishing the goals of federalism. In short, Technique #1 may
be considered a reasonable balance between the goals of free trade and
economic integration on the one hand, and federalism or decentralization
on the other. International standards should be promoted and harmoniza-
tion pursued, but exceptions should be allowed where a particular juris-
diction finds a different standard necessary because its constituents have
assigned a different (higher) value to non-economic goals.
Technique #2 similarly does not pose any significant concerns either,
at least in terms of the example given. If nations pursue rules with
regard to sanitary and phytosanitary measures seeking to effectively
eliminate non-science-based trade barriers and sub-national measures are
consistent with these rules, then this is the best possible scenario. States
base their SPS measures on science and a risk assessment and, thus,
arbitrary and protectionist laws are generally avoided. If the United
States sought to negotiate rules simply based on whether existing state
(and federal) law would be consistent with the proposed rules, then the
rules would cease to perform a liberalization function and Technique #2
As to the notion of different preference sets, see Trachtman, supra note 24.
,60 See ALAN SYKES, PRODUCr STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MAR-
KETS (1995). See also Joel P. Trachtman, L'etat, C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration,
and Subsidiarity, 33 HARVARD INr'L LJ. 459, 471 (noting that a "new" approach to harmoniza-
tion within the European Union may be less threatening).
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would be subject to criticism.
In contrast, Techniques #3 and 4 generally seek to exclude states
and provinces from complying with anti-protectionism obligations (or in
the case of the NAAEC from other central obligations within the agree-
ment). Use of Technique #3 does interfere with the goal of maximizing
welfare gains and economic efficiency. More importantly, the technique
often does so without a corresponding gain in legitimate non-economic
goals. If measures immunized from Technique #3 were enacted for non-
protectionist reasons, such measures would likely fit within the general
exceptions clauses of trade agreements and, therefore, would not need
protection in the form of grandfathering. Thus, it is the elimination of
laws receiving immunity from these techniques (and which could not be
justified by the general exception clauses of trade agreements) that are
most likely to enhance welfare gains and least likely to interfere with
the legitimate pursuit of non-economic values under a federal or decen-
tralized system of government. A further reason for criticizing the use of
Technique #3 is its potential effect on domestic constitutional constraints
on U.S. state protectionism and liberalization efforts within Canada.
Laws immunized through Technique #3 may be less likely to be found
in violation of the dormant foreign commerce clause within U.S. juris-
prudence.' Moreover, the technique diminishes some impetus for the
creation of such domestic liberalization devices as the Internal Trade
Agreement within Canada.
The two illustrations of Technique #4 must be distinguished. In the
case of state involvement in the government procurement agreement,
political constraints lead to involvement on a voluntary basis only. Thus,
states are prevented from enacting future discriminatory laws only to the
extent they choose. In the context of the Government Procurement
Agreement, this leads to a result in which existing state laws inconsis-
tent with obligations within the agreement are protected from challenge.
Like Technique #3, therefore, the use of this technique interferes with
the goal of maximizing welfare gains typically without a corresponding
gain in legitimate non-economic goals. In the case of provincial involve-
ment in the NAAEC, constitutional constraints rather than merely politi-
cal constraints necessitated a voluntary approach. Moreover, the central
obligation of the NAAEC is not an anti-protectionism obligation. Rather,
it is an obligation to effectively enforce environmental laws. It is ques-
tionable whether the lowering of environmental compliance costs through
failure to enforce environmental laws is significantly trade distorting in
,6, See Schaefer, supra note 39, at 616.
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most industries." Thus, one can question whether welfare gains of
liberalized trade are interfered with as a result of non-participation by
the provinces in the side environmental agreement. Indeed, in light of
how the agreement defines failure to enforce," it is questionable
whether non-participation by the provinces has a significant effect on
environmental enforcement.
Effect of Eliminating
Various Techniques
#1: Elimination of this technique by mandating rather
than encouraging harmonization enhances free trade
free 4 but hinders federalism.
trade " #3-4: Elimination of these techniques by not exempting
federalism existing sub-federal laws violating anti-protectionism
rules enhances free trade without hindering federalism,
i.e. leads to Pareto gains.
V. ACHIEVING PARETO GAINS: PossiBnrrlEs FOR PARTICIPATION OF
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN RULE FORMATION PROCESSES
The central question that arises is how best to negotiate the elimina-
tion of protectionist laws receiving immunity from challenge through
Techniques #3-4. Some of these laws, of course, will have concentrated,
entrenched interests opposing elimination of the protected status granted
these laws by international trade agreements. Techniques #3-4 were fol-
lowed due to the political constraints of federalism within the United
States and the political, as well as in some instances, possible constitu-
tional restraints placed on the Canadian government. How should these
political and constitutional restraints best be overcome in future negotia-
tions to secure the elimination of state and provincial laws violating
anti-protectionism norms? This question necessitates an examination of
sub-national government participation in traditional trade negotiation
processes. An additional question that can be raised is how best to ne-
gotiate harmonized standards so that harmonization is pursued in a man-
" GATr, Report on Trade and the Environment (Feb. 1992).
NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 45(1).
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ner that does not unduly interfere with the attainment of different prefer-
ence sets by different geographic constituencies. This question necessi-
tates a look at a second type of rule formation process: trade agreement
administration by international bodies.
The second type of rule formation process refers to those instances
in which an initial trade agreement establishes administering bodies that
are empowered to elaborate further rules. For instance, certain NAFrA
chapters establish committees to supervise implementation of the chapter.
Many of these committees are charged with developing recommendations
for harmonizing standards. These NAFrA committees will be comprised
of representatives of the three federal governments who will do the
negotiation over harmonization. Any results of the negotiation, in other
words any recommendation of a committee, will be a result of consen-
sus. Thus, NAFrA committees may not be seen as so different from
traditional trade negotiations in certain respects. Nonetheless, a distinc-
tion is still meaningful in that the committees are permanent bodies with
a mandate to continually negotiate and hold regularly scheduled meet-
ings. Additionally, executive branch departments outside trade ministries
hold primary responsibility for the work of some NAFrA committees.
To be sure, the distinction between traditional trade negotiations and
trade agreement administration by international bodies becomes more
apparent in agreements delegating legislative functions to an international
body. For instance, the agreements creating the European Community
create a supranational body, the European Council, with legislative pow-
ers in which weighted majority voting of Member State representatives
controls most matters. Regulations passed by the European Council also
become part of and superior to laws in Member States of the European
Community. In contrast, any trade agreement administration capacity
granted to FTAA bodies will likely be identical to the capacity of
NAFTA committees. The lack of legislative functions to be granted
FTAA bodies suggests that the participation and protections afforded
sub-national governments need not be as far-reaching as those obtained
by the German lander with respect to matters addressed by the European
Union. The participation of U.S. states and Canadian provinces in tradi-
tional trade negotiations is explored first, followed by a brief analysis of
state participation in trade agreement administration undertaken by
NAFrA committees. Participation of states and provinces in trade agree-
ment dispute settlement cases involving their laws is also briefly consid-
ered because it may be an inducement for state and provincial consent
to further liberalization.
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A. Traditional Trade Negotiations
1. United States: Current Approaches and Possible Future Ap-
proaches
The United States has established an Intergovernmental Policy Advi-
sory Committee (IGPAC) to provide input from state and local govern-
ments into trade negotiations. During on-going trade negotiations, the
IGPAC is given regular updates on the status of negotiations and is
sometimes allowed to view draft negotiating texts. Additionally, the
IGPAC is required to issue a report once trade negotiations have con-
cluded, prior to consideration of an agreement by Congress.
The 1974 Trade Act required the president to seek advice and infor-
mation from "representative elements" of the non-federal governmental
sector with respect to trade agreement negotiation and implementation,
and consult with "representative elements" of the non-governmental
sector on the overall current trade policy of the United States.'" It al-
so allows the president, "if necessary," to establish policy advisory com-
mittees representing non-federal government interests to provide the
policy advice." The Trade & Tariff Act of 1984, which granted the
executive the authority to negotiate on trade-in-services, stated that the
president "shall, as he deems appropriate: (i) consult with state govern-
ments on issues of trade policy, including negotiating objectives and
implementation of trade agreements, affecting the regulatory authority of
non-Federal governments, or their procurement of goods and services;
(ii) establish one or more intergovernmental policy advisory committees
on trade which shall serve as a principal forum in which State and local
governments may consult with the federal government with respect to
matters described in clause (i); and (iii) provide to state and local gov-
ernments. . , upon their request, advice, assistance, and, except as oth-
erwise may be prohibited by law, data, analyses and information con-
cerning U.S. policies on international trade-in-services."''
The IGPAC was the committee established as the forum for such
consultations. The IGPAC typically is comprised of thirty to forty state
and local officials with state governors the most represented office.
While the IGPAC provides a manageable forum for advice on negoti-
ations, it is questionable that the body will have the necessary legitima-
cy to give a political stamp of approval to eliminate state measures
21 U.S.C. 2155, Trade Act of 1974, § 135(a)(2).
" Id. § 135(b).
6 19 U.S.C. 2114b-c.
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protected by Techniques #3-4. Many states are not represented on the
IGPAC. Moreover, the IGPAC is not required to be bi-partisan and
since its members are selected by the Administration, there is a concern
that its views may not represent a full spectrum of the views that exist
at the state level.
While the federal government would have the legal power to enter
into an international trade agreement affecting state laws protected by
Techniques #3-4 without the consent of the states as a legal matter,
significant political restraints will mean that the federal government must
obtain state consent in some fashion. The central question is what type
of consent should the federal government seek: individual consent, ma-
jority consent, or unanimous consent.
Individual consent is in fact Technique #4, the basic approach fol-
lowed today with respect to government procurement and the elimination
of "grandfathered" or exempted laws. The process of removing protec-
tionist state laws would probably proceed slowest along this course,
although educational efforts could have some success. One issue facing
the states, particularly the larger states, under an individual consent
approach is a sort of "free rider" problem. Foreign countries are most
interested in gaining access to the procurement markets of the larger
states. Similarly, foreign countries are most interested in the removal of
protectionist measures affecting services and investment by the largest
states. However, these larger states sometimes worry that part of the
benefits of reciprocal concessions gained as a result of their willingness
to eliminate procurement preferences (or grandfathered discriminatory
laws) will flow to states that have not agreed to liberalize. The question
arises as to whether benefits can or should be linked to liberalizing
efforts. Should the United States link the use of its "negotiating chips"
to a state's willingness to eliminate protectionist procurement and servic-
es measures? For instance, if California agrees to eliminate protectionist
measures immunized by Techniques #3&4, should it receive the expen-
diture of U.S. negotiating chips on a sector of importance to the state
(e.g. audiovisual)? The problem is the feasibility of making such linkag-
es and the messiness such an approach would create if taken to the
extreme.
The United States could also seek majority consent or unanimous
consent of states to eliminate the protected status of a particular type of
protectionist law. The question becomes whether majority consent will
be sufficient and from whom such consent should be sought. Less than
unanimous consent could be sufficient since a majority vote in both
houses of Congress is all that is needed to approve a trade agreement.
Moreover, trade agreements are generally subject to Fast Track proce-
[Vol. 23:441 1997
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dures which do not allow trade agreement bills to be bottled up in
committee or to be filibustered on the Senate floor. Additionally, con-
gressional members will consider a range of other factors in casting
their votes. How large a majority of consent of state officials would be
needed would likely depend on the political sensitivity of the issue.
Another central issue is from which officials of the various states should
political consent be sought. In the GATT7 government procurement nego-
tiations, it was the consent of state governors that was sought. This ap-
proach was valid in that context because no commitments were made
that would necessitate a change in existing laws. However, elimination
or reform of state laws receiving protection from Techniques #3 and 4
will require action by state legislatures and governors. Thus, these issues
could be raised in the context of the national associations representing
state legislatures and the governors, the National Conference of State
Legislatures, and the National Governors' Association. These bodies
have supra-majority voting procedures and thus a resolution supporting
the reciprocal elimination through trade negotiations of a particular type
of discriminatory measure would likely carry significant political weight.
An additional or second track of the approach might -be to seek the
consent of the national association representing the state regulatory offi-
cials in the affected area. However, such consent is often more difficult
to obtain because such groups do not necessarily take into account a
broad spectrum of interests.
2. Canada. Current Approaches and Possible Future Approaches
In practice, the Canadian federal government consults with the prov-
inces before entering into an international agreement that falls wholly or
in part within the domestic legislative jurisdiction of the provinces."
This consultation process would be politically necessary even without
the Labor Conventions doctrine, however, the "watertight compartments"
approach for implementing international obligations certainly changes the
bargaining position and tenor of such negotiations. For instance, exten-
sive consultations between the provinces and the federal government
took place during the CUSFTA, NAFTA, and Uruguay Round negotia-
tions although the mechanism for such consultations is informal and not
mandated by legislation." As demanded by the federal government,
'67 1986 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 399.
"6 See generally Doug Brown, The Federal-Provincial Consultation Process, CANADA: TE
STAT OF THE FEERATION 77 (1987-88); Manitoba's Position on NAFTA 14 (Dec. 1992).
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no provincial representatives were allowed at the negotiating table."6
Instead, a single negotiator representing Canada received its mandate
from the federal government in consultation with First Ministers.
170
However, provincial negotiators have accompanied federal negotiators to
trade meetings with the United States on specific trade disputes. For in-
stance, British Columbia and Quebec sent negotiators along with the
federal government to discussions with the United States over the long-
standing lumber subsidies dispute.
The use of Techniques #3 and 4 has allowed the Canadian federal
government to avoid any immediate jurisdictional conflicts with the
provinces over areas addressed in trade agreements. However, possible
constitutional constraints could arise in any effort to eliminate discrimi-
natory provincial laws protected in international trade agreements
through Technique #3. Indeed, interprovincial barriers to trade were
recently addressed through an intergovernmental agreement rather than
through federal legislation. Accordingly, the Canadian government might
seek to use an intergovernmental agreement to eliminate "grandfathered"
NAFTA laws or laws reserved in the GATS. The federal government
generally does not enter into agreements with jurisdictional ambiguity
over their implementation without seeking assurances from the provinces
that they are willing and able to carry out the obligations within provin-
cial jurisdiction."' The rejected Charlottetown Constitutional Agree-
ment would have clarified and formalized the legal status of intergovern-
mental and indemnity agreements. As it stands, such arrangements have
never been tested in the courts."7 To the extent such agreements seek
to bind future provincial legislatures, their legal basis remains
uncertain." The federal government negotiated an intergovernmental
agreement with the provinces for participation in the NAAEC, but again
the tangible benefits to provinces of entering into such an agreement
have not been a sufficient inducement for most provinces to date. Thus,
Canada may need to face the question of how and whether to tie tangi-
ble benefits to provincial elimination of discriminatory laws protected by
Technique #3 in the trade context as well. Constitutional amendment or
judicial reinterpretation of certain constitutional provisions may eliminate
constitutional restraints on the federal government. However, such devel-
169 Id.
'7 Id.
1986 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 400-01.
" Richard Simeon, Federalism and Free Trade, in CANADA:THE STATE OF THE FEDERATION
188, 202 (1987).
173 id.
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opments would not eliminate all political restraints."
B. Treaty Administration Capabilities of International Bodies: U.S.
States in NAFTA Committee Activities
The U.S. implementing legislation of the NAF1A provides a consul-
tation process between federal and state governments on implementation
and administration of the agreement. Specifically, the implementing law
declares: "The states will be involved (including involvement through
the inclusion of appropriate representatives of the States) to the greatest
extent practicable at each stage of the development of United States
positions regarding matters [under the NAFTA that directly relate to, or
will potentially have a direct impact on, the States] that will be ad-
dressed by committees, subcommittees, or working groups established
under the [NAFTA]." The statement of administrative action accompany-
ing the implementing law and approved together with the law by Con-
gress gives further elaboration. It reiterates that the Administration will
involve "the states to the greatest extent possible in the development of
U.S. positions with respect to issues subject to state jurisdiction that are
addressed by the various committees and working groups." States are
permitted to be involved in federal agency preparations for NAFTA
committee work. The advice states give must be taken into account, but
is not binding on the federal government. States are given no guarantee
to attend actual committee meetings. However, they will be invited to
attend as observers where the federal government determines it is "ap-
propriate and feasible." The federal government traditionally does not al-
low state representatives to attend international trade negotiations and
thus, there was some hesitancy on the part of the federal government to
grant a guaranteed right to attend negotiations occurring under the aus-
pices of the committees. State representatives have attended meetings of
the Land Transportation Standards subcommittee, but have complained
over the lack of consultation on the activities of other committees. 75
As noted above, any trade agreement administration capability of
FTAA bodies is likely to be similar to that of NAFTA bodies. NAFTA
committee recommendations regarding harmonization are not legislative
actions, but more closely related to traditional negotiations. Recommen-
" See Whyte, supra note 99, at 270. Others criticize this possibility as a case of judicial
activism or judicial politics. See, e.g., Ivan Bernier, Commentary on Professor White's Paper, 13
CAN. Bus. LJ. 303, 305.
' See Kantor Silent on States' Desire to Monitor NAFTA Implementation, INSIDE NAFrA,
Nov. 29, 1995, at 7.
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dations require unanimity not qualified majority voting. Additionally,
such recommendations are not directly applicable in the three NAFTA
countries. Any recommendation would require congressional action
and/or Executive Branch action under previously delegated authority.
States could obviously enter the debate at the implementation stage.
However, it is politically wise to allow for consultations at the negotiat-
ing stage as is done during traditional trade negotiations themselves. The
involvement of states at the stage of negotiations is particularly appro-
priate in light of the discussion above of harmonized standards, which
can be seen as most threatening to the goals of federalism.
C. Participation of Sub-Federal Governments in NAFTA & WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Cases
Sub-national involvement in trade agreement dispute settlement pro-
cesses in those cases involving a challenge to their laws could also
enhance the possibility of obtaining consent for further liberalization. As
noted above, some form of state and provincial consent is necessary to
avoid political obstacles, and in the case of Canada possible legal obsta-
cles, to removing protectionist trade measures immunized by Techniques
#3 through 4. If states and provinces maintain a role in the dispute
settlement cases involving a challenge to their laws, they will have a
greater assurance that liberalized rules to which they agree are fairly
interpreted and not unfairly expanded. It will likely act as an induce-
ment for their consent to liberalization, although admittedly it probably
will not be enough in itself as can be seen from the Canadian intergov-
ernmental agreements on the NAFMA side environmental and labor
agreements. These intergovernmental agreements actually grant the Cana-
dian provinces the lead role in disputes involving their enforcement
practices, yet only two provinces have agreed to be bound by the
NAAEC.
Additionally, involvement of sub-national governments in the process
is likely to lead to a greater willingness to comply with any adverse
decisions. 6 Such involvement will thus make federal enforcement ac-
tion, with its consequent political and, in the case of Canada, potential
constitutional implications, less likely to be necessary. The mechanisms
developed in the U.S. implementing legislation for the NAFTA and
Uruguay Round Agreements which highlight federal-state cooperation,
but maintain ultimate control with the federal government appear to be
76 See Schaefer, supra note 39, at 646-48.
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proper in light of the potential trade effects on other parts of the nation
resulting from an adverse panel report."
VI. CONCLUSION
Federalism, and other movements towards decentralization, seek to
enhance democracy and promote experimentation. This allows federa-
tions, or other decentralized forms of government, to maximize the
attainment of different preference sets of different territorial populations.
International trade agreements seek welfare gains by reducing barriers to
trade and allowing comparative advantage to operate more fully. While
international trade agreements generally apply to sub-federal govern-
ments, various techniques have been developed to immunize certain sub-
federal government actions from challenge at the expense of welfare
gains from free trade. Moreover, not all of the techniques are justifiable
as preventing a diminution in the values of federalism. Thus, Pareto
gains in the relationship between free trade and federalism can be
achieved by scaling back the techniques that are unjustifiable.
Harmonization obligations within trade agreements do lead to poten-
tial trade;-offs between the goals of federalism and the goals of increased
trade. However, trade agreements have encouraged rather than mandated
harmonization. Trade agreements should continue to proceed cautiously
with respect to harmonization obligations. Moreover, sub-national in-
volvement in the move towards harmonization may be able to identify
those standards and areas in which harmonization will increase efficien-
cy without unduly interfering with the attainment of different preference
sets of non-economic values.
While federalism is meant to encourage experimentation, actions
against foreign interests in the name of protectionism is an experiment
that has been tried and has failed. Thus, any less favorable treatment of
foreign goods, services, and investors should be justified as essential to
achieving a legitimate non-economic goal. Indeed, certain federal states,
including the United States, have existing domestic constitutional con-
straints on sub-federal governments that are similar to and, to a certain
extent, overlap with anti-protectionism obligations within trade agree-
ments. It is no surprise that such limits exist in certain federations and
in those federations in which limits are not as prevalent, that the ab-
sence of such limits is sought to be overcome through other means. The
domestic constitutional constraints in the United States and constraints in
177 Id.
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other forms in Canada, such as the Internal Trade Agreement, are recog-
nition that anti-protectionism obligations are generally not a threat to
federalism or decentralization movements. Thus, it is likely that trade
agreements can proceed further in constraining the discretion of sub-
national governments to take protectionist measures. Techniques #3 and
4, which legally or as a practical matter "grandfather" or exempt exist-
ing state discriminatory sub-national measures from anti-protectionism
obligations could be scaled back to increase welfare gains from freer
trade without threatening federalism.
However, political and, in the case of Canada, potential constitution-
al constraints, inhibit the attainment of these Pareto gains in the relation-
ship between free trade and federalism. While the United States federal
government has an exclusive treaty implementing power and a broad
commerce power, states have sufficient political power to make the
federal government "reluctant" to bind the states to a anti-protectionism
obligations already provided for in the NAFTA and Uruguay Round
Agreements. The existence of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
does not minimize this reluctance to a great extent because7 of the gaps
in its coverage and because of lingering uncertainty over the similarities
and differences between the doctrine and anti-protectionism obligations
within trade agreements. The constraints in Canada are less veiled; the
Canadian federal government does not have an exclusive treaty imple-
menting power nor does it have as broad a commerce power as the U.S.
federal government. Thus, it is likely that the consent of sub-national
governments will be required in order to remove the immunity sub-na-
tional laws receive under Techniques #3 and 4. New, more extensive
federal-component unit consultation mechanisms and different consent
processes than the individual consent provided for by Technique #4 may
need to be developed and relied upon as a result. In the government
procurement context, Technique #4 did not lead to liberalization but
merely a "standstill" obligation against new protectionism. Formulating
an approach to obtaining consent will not be easy, but will clearly be
worthwhile as Pareto gains in the relationship between free trade and
federalism are possible within the FTAA and other future trade negotia-
tions.
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